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It’s like living in the mind of a depressed hippy (Curtis 2007b) 
Adam Curtis is a BAFTA award-winning documentary filmmaker who 
employs borrowed images from the past to construct complex accounts 
of the political present. Produced primarily for the medium of television 
(the BBC), though this has expanded in recent years to include digital 
platforms, his films consist of an idiosyncratic use of archived image 
and sound fragments: Hollywood and British films, news footage, 
expert vox pops, television shows, corporate training films, drone 
footage, film music, sound effects, and so on. These fragments are 
generally overlayed by a serious ‘matter of fact’, journalistic voice-over 
narration (Curtis himself), that tells the story of our times. Curtis is well-
known as a polemicist. His films directly question and challenge the 
proficiency of political elites. For instance, a powerful sequence in 
Curtis’s most debated and cited film, The power of nightmares (2004), 
consists of news footage of George W Bush on a podium looking direct 
to camera. Bush triumphantly announces, ‘one by one terrorists are 
learning the meaning of American justice’. This image is inserted at the 
end of a longer sequence that provides an account of absurdist court 
cases against ‘terror suspects’ in the USA. After the attacks upon the 
WTC towers, law enforcement, in its various forms, is busy gathering 
evidence against ‘terror suspects’ inside America’s borders. The film 
reveals that the gathered evidence is specious and thin. The Bush 
image is suitably supplemented by a comic, rhythmic musical 
composition by the well-known composer, Ennio Morricone, fittingly 
titled: ‘Indagine su un cittadino al di sopra di ogni sospetto’ 
[Investigation of a citizen above suspicion]. The bassoon, block, and 
‘boing’ sounds that mark the composition lend a comic tone to Bush’s 
emphatic statement. In the sequence, American justice emerges as far 
from just. Bush’s statement is patently absurd (Curtis 2004).  
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‘Bushspeak’ has, of course, provided much material for comedians, 
pundits, documentary filmmakers, and social media users (the same 
can already be said for the president elect, Donald Trump). Curtis has 
not added anything new to this chorus. But what I want to suggest is 
that this articulation of political absurdity is emblematic of Curtis’s films 
in general. This sequence consists of the fragments and strange 
combinations that mark his productions, and it reveals a characteristic 
suspicion of political elites and the ideas that underpin their plans for 
society. I take this suspicion as a central, if not the central, defining 
feature of Curtis’s work. This paper will thus unpack what underpins this 
suspicion and explore its substance. In the case of Curtis, it has to be 
noted that it isn't clear if this is a suspicion of politics in general or of 
politics as it is today. Is his a neoliberal suspicion of ideology, or does 
it belong to the leftist hermeneutics of suspicion? As a perplexed Paul 
Arthur asks, we know Curtis despises ‘modern forms of liberalism’, 
however, his ‘political fealties are murky and somewhat contradictory. 
Is he a Laborite social democrat, a pragmatic socialist, an anarchist (or 
Christian anarchist like Tolstoy)?’ (2007, p. 17). At any rate, my aim in 
this paper is not to situate Curtis within a political framework. Rather, 
my aim is to explore the essential logic of this suspicion and unpack the 
substance of thinking with Curtis. This means I aim to consider Curtis’s 
stories as a form of social theory. To get to this form, it is necessary to 
engage with three overlapping terrains: criticism of Curtis’s films, Curtis 
as journalist, and the filmmaking techniques Curtis employs. This paper 
will consider each of these terrains, and then turn to the question of 
Curtis’s logic as form of social theory.  
To avoid equivocation, my use of the term ‘logic’ is drawn directly from 
discourse analysis. I am concerned with the substance of Curtis’s 
journalistic stories about contemporary power and politics. Rather than 
the conventional understanding of ‘logic’ as a specific form of reasoning 
or argumentative validity, I employ ‘logic’ in place of ‘mechanisms’ or 
causal ‘laws’. My basic assumption is hermeneutic. Logics consist of 
the ‘purposes, rules and ontological presuppositions that render a 
practice or regime possible and intelligible’ (Glynos & Howarth 2007, p. 
15). In other words, logics support practices, they provide the 
conditions that ‘make that practice ‘work’ or ‘tick’’ (2007, p. 15). In this 
sense, a ‘logic’ is more analogous to rationales or motivations. We can 
imagine Curtis in the basement of the BBC archive trawling through 
various kinds of footage, working upon image and sound combinations, 
constructing narratives about politics. He is a journalist grappling with 
how to make sense of the political present, a present, we might add, 
that is difficult to articulate. ‘How do you illustrate something invisible?’ 
(Letham 2016), Curtis asks. This problem lies at the core of his filmic 
undertakings. This is why an attention to logic is indispensable. At the 
material level, his films consist of found bits that we can understand as 
representational fragments, or familiar images and sounds of the world. 
These fragments are logically combined to produce meaning.  
It is worth noting that it is precisely the question of logic, or lack of logic, 
that has been central in criticism of Curtis’s documentaries. His 
distinctive filmic style has been engaged with in two broad ways. In the 
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first, the films are rejected outright and in the second, the films are 
understood sympathetically but cautiously. In the case of the former, 
Melanie Phillips describes The power of nightmares (2004), as a 
‘bizarre conspiracy theory [that] had about as much grip on reality as 
claims that the world was controlled by the Illuminati’ (2010, p. 126). 
Similarly, Tim Crook proclaims that The power of nightmares ‘over-
simplifies a much more complex series of events and political 
influences’ (2010, p. 196). Paul Arthur employs the language of 
McLuhan to assert Curtis is an ‘unclassifiable bricoleur’ who 
‘establishes his own discursive authority via hip spurts of image-sound 
collision swaddling the kind of didactic yammering that could easily 
alienate viewers if applied in a more conventional idiom – the formal 
massage is inseparable from the message’ (2007, p. 16). Such critics 
might perhaps argue that Curtis’s assessment of contemporary 
journalism, quoted at the outset of the paper, would be a fitting 
description of his own work. In cases of the latter, Jonathan 
Rosenbaum, for instance, contends Curtis’s style is a form of ‘jazz 
improvisation’. And having ‘continually being won over by the grand 
explanations for most of our contemporary problems’, he nevertheless 
avers, ‘a closer look at Curtis’s filmmaking style starts to raise a few 
questions about both the arguments themselves and the way he 
propounds them’ (2008, pp. 70-71). Likewise, Peter Bergen warily 
stresses ‘despite [his] many disagreements with The Power of 
Nightmares, which sometimes has the feel of a Noam Chomsky lecture 
channeled by Monty Python, it is a richly rewarding film because it 
treats its audience as adults capable of following complex arguments’ 
(2005, pp. 33-34). Angus Macqueen perhaps sums up this cautious 
position best. He contends ‘Curtis is in many ways the most important 
documentary voice on British TV, simply because he puts across mad 
arguments and compels you to engage with them’ (Bromwich et al. 
2016). This paper will take up Curtis’s so-called compelling madness in 
terms of this question of logic. To put it simply, this paper asks what 
happens if we do take seriously the claim that Curtis is both a Chomsky 
and a Monty Python? I’m not so sure such a combination is so troubling. 
For instance, in the case of Monty Python, the satirical representation 
of hard-line leftist politics in The Life of Brian (1979), in the form of the 
People’s Front of Judea, does not seem to be wide of the mark. 
Perhaps Curtis’s strange style of journalism is not so wide of the 
political mark either (Jones 1979).  
As the critics cited above all seem to suggest, Curtis resists 
classification. However, despite this resistance there are consistent 
points of articulation and repetition within his work. Curtis can be 
located; his documentary style is far from mad, if we understand 
madness as incoherence and without regular patterns, or as without a 
logic. What makes Curtis compelling is that his documentaries consist 
of the messy entanglement of compilation film practices with 
journalism, which aims to inform the public what is happening in the 
world. The end result, I maintain, is both a powerful articulation of the 
post-political present and a compelling form of social theory.  
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The power of political ideas 
I want to consider Curtis as a filmmaker and journalist grappling with 
the post-political condition of contemporary power. His is a search for 
an adequate form of expression for what he takes as the logic of 
presentism within today’s managerial age. Politics today, he explains, 
‘doesn’t want to look to the future. It just [looks to the past] to manage 
the present’ (cited in Obrist 2012). Curtis can thus be squarely located 
in terms of Wilson & Swyngedouw’s (2014) succinct explanation of the 
post-political present. Drawing on Mouffe (2005), Žižek (1999), and 
Rancière (1999), among others, they explain: in the post-political 
situation   
the political—understood as a space of contestation and agonistic 
engagement—is increasingly colonised by politics—understood as 
technocratic mechanisms and consensual procedures that operate 
within an unquestioned framework of representative democracy, free 
market economics, and cosmopolitan liberalism. In post-politics, 
political contradictions are reduced to policy problems to be 
managed by experts and legitimated through participatory processes 
in which the scope of possible outcomes is narrowly defined in 
advance. ‘The people’—as a potentially disruptive political 
collective—is replaced by the population—the aggregated object of 
opinion polls, surveillance, and bio-political optimisation. Citizens 
become consumers, and elections are framed as just another 
‘choice’, in which individuals privately select their preferred 
managers of the conditions of economic necessity. (Wilson & 
Swyngedouw 2014, p. 6)  
If we follow this line of thought to Mark Fisher’s convincing account of 
contemporary culture’s inability ‘to grasp and articulate the present’ 
(2014, p. 8), in Curtis’s films politics is a stark symptom of this inability. 
Curtis characteristically excavates from history the political ideas that 
have become foundational for contemporary political ambitions. He 
typically understands the ambition of political elites as an intention to 
build a better, more stable, freer society. What he attempts to 
demonstrate is that this modern aim invariably produces its opposite: a 
society in crisis preoccupied with control. Along with The power of 
nightmares, his most recent films, The century of the self (2002), The 
trap: what happened to our dream of freedom (2007), All watched over 
by machines of loving grace (2011), Bitter lake (2015), and 
HyperNormalisation (2016) all work, in overlapping ways, precisely in 
terms of the aforementioned inability.  
The century of the self charts the long rise, from Freud to Edward 
Bernays and beyond, of contemporary focus group politics. In this 
context, governments no longer aim to govern. Instead, they aim to be 
responsive to the desires of self-interested individuals, what Bernard 
Stiegler calls the ‘proletarinized consumer’ (2010, pp. 25-28). Curtis 
shows this leads to a chaotic form of governance. In The power of 
nightmares chaos and threat from outside forces feature as a central 
concern for politicians. They discover that their purpose is to protect the 
public from nightmarish possibilities. This produces a paranoid and 
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controlled society that is suspicious of contingency and difference 
(Curtis 2004). The trap (Curtis 2007) explores the related tension 
between freedom and certainty. The necessity of certainty, understood 
here as the demand for predictability in the context of Cold War 
paranoia, opens the door for a calculative rationality that propagates 
‘counter-finality’, in Sartre’s sense of the term (2006). All watched over 
by machines of loving grace directly questions the Silicon Valley belief 
in the capacity of self-organising social systems, modelled upon the 
neoliberal subject, to overcome hierarchical forms of political 
organisation. Curtis contends that such systems simply lead to a new 
form of autocracy (Curtis 2011). Bitter Lake explores the disastrous, 
unanticipated consequences of Saudi Arabia’s agreement with the USA 
in the 1920s to allow access to their oil, but only with the caveat that 
the Saudis aggressive and intolerant form of Islam, Wahhabism, would 
remain unhindered (Curtis 2015). And HyperNormalisation, which I will 
consider in more detail below, presents a bleak account of increasing 
global instability and the powerlessness of politicians to do anything to 
keep this in check. Curtis maintains that this powerlessness is a 
symptom of post-political culture that emerged in the 1970s, in which 
individuals, suspicious of collective political action, watch with cool 
detachment. Individuals retreat instead into the carefully constructed 
fake world produced by the new hi-tech corporations (Curtis 2016).   
In each of these films we find the specific Curtis formulation: identify 
specific figures and their grapple with socio-political reality, articulate 
the ideas formulated in response to this perceived reality, trace the life 
of the idea as it is taken up by powerful elites in their contexts, and then 
demonstrate how the ideas fail to grasp socio-political reality and 
deliver the desired effects. This is a formulation, we might add, with 
more than a passing resemblance to the techniques of that branch of 
political studies that focuses upon ideas and their relation to the 
material interests of political agents. John L Campbell, for instance, 
argues for scholarship that includes,  
identifying the actors who seek to influence policy making with their 
ideas, ascertaining the institutional conditions under which these 
actors have more or less influence, and understanding how political 
discourse affects the degree to which policy ideas are communicated 
and translated into practice. (2002, p. 21) 
As can be seen, ideas are central in the Curtis formulation. As he 
explains in an interview with Hans Ulrich Obrist, ‘I spend my whole time 
just looking at how ideas have consequences, not necessarily what the 
promoters of them intended’. He continues: 
One of the things I’m fascinated by at the moment is the rise of 
managerial theory. It works in absurd, comic ways. It leads to the 
police being told that they have a certain quota of criminals they have 
to catch, so if they can’t catch them, they go and make them up. 
These are very comic, silly things that I would have done on a 
program like That’s Life!, but they’re also expressions of something 
that Weber wrote about back in the nineteenth century which he 
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called the ‘iron cage,’ about how rationality, when applied to social 
situations to try and control and manage societies, would often lead 
to absurd outcomes. (Curtis cited in Obrist 2012) 
As Curtis states, the iron cage of rationality and the production of 
absurdity are central for his logic. We can usefully link Curtis’s logic to 
Weber’s famous distinction between, what he called, ‘world images’ 
and ‘ideal interests’. In a much-cited passage on the problem of social 
redemption Weber suggests:  
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's 
conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been 
created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along 
which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. (1946, p. 
280) 
It is clear that for Weber world images, which can be defined as 
disinterested ideas, function as a crucial resource for the pursuit of 
material interests. It is also the case that, in many instances, world 
ideas direct such pursuits. As Eastwood argues, Weber is highlighting 
‘the role that the need for ‘meaning’ plays in causally motivating 
someone to go down one or another track’ (2005, p. 94). Curtis is 
clearly concerned with the ideas through which politicians and power 
elites derive meaning, define their purpose and build tracks. We thus 
need to consider how Curtis’s films articulate political ideas and the 
formation of tracks. How do Curtis’s films work? How does he construct 
narratives committed to articulating the iron cage of rationality?  
The Problem of Curtis’s style  
I turn now to consider Curtis’s filmic style. In order to unpack Curtis’s 
logic, we need to explore the relationship between art and nonfiction 
film. This relationship is important in this context because we need to 
decide whether or not Curtis’s films are motivated by artistic concerns, 
exploring the documentary form, or didactic concerns, as in informing 
the public what is happening in the world. For his part, Curtis resolutely 
‘considers himself a journalist’ rather than a formal innovator (Greene 
2016). However, criticism of his films can’t seem to decide. As I have 
stated, the two strands of criticism of Curtis’s films tend to focus upon 
supposed disjunctions between narrator and image. At first blush this 
focus seems valid. Curtis appears to be exploring this disjunction, and 
can be broadly approached as an ‘experimental’ documentary 
filmmaker. From this first approach, the focus is upon the formal play of 
images and their relation to the authority of the narrative voice. 
Correspondingly, the formal properties of the film can be understood as 
problematizing and questioning representation itself. The authority of 
the journalistic narrative voice is disrupted and truth claims are thus 
questioned. However, Curtis’s films don’t quite fit the experimental 
category, if, as I have suggested, this category involves undermining 
representation. This is because Curtis’s political commentaries require 
spectators to comprehend and follow the authoritative voice of the 
narrator. The play of images doesn’t seem to succeed in disrupting the 
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narrative voice (clearly Curtis argues with images rather than against 
them). Conversely, in the second of the aforementioned assessment of 
Curtis critics, Curtis’s political commentary is not only undiminished but 
also foregrounded relative to the imagery. Questions concerning the 
validity of his statements about politics and veracity of the evidence for 
supporting the statements become central. This leads to problems as 
well. In this second approach, it seems that the play of images disrupts 
the narrative voice too much, as in Bergen’s claim that the films are 
Monty Pythonesque, for example (2005, pp. 33-34). His 
experimentation with images doesn’t seem to provide solid evidence 
for the commentary. On this basis, some have even concluded that 
Curtis’s is thus the voice of conspiracy theory, understood pejoratively. 
Conspiracy films tend to revolve around shadowy figures, widespread 
causal links, unanswered questions and enigmatic gaps in knowledge. 
And the absence of evidence is often presented as proof of conspiracy 
(Nicholls 2011). The supposed lack of presented evidence in Curtis’s 
arguments can be read in these terms as baseless assertions forged 
via dubious causal links. I don’t think, however, the conspiracy charge 
helps us understand Curtis’s films.  
The difficulty with Curtis’s films is that, on one level, we see and hear 
fragments, and, on the other level, we hear clear pronouncements 
about contemporary politics that bear no straightforward relationship to 
the fragments. The form seemingly pulls in different directions: 
didacticism versus play, an argumentative logic versus fragmentation. 
Curtis criticism is, hence, cautious or hostile. His films don’t allow critics 
to decide which side of the experimental/didactic ledger he sits on. And 
the centripetal force of Curtis’s style makes it difficult to situate his films 
within existing documentary categories. We thus need to ask: where 
might we situate Curtis in terms of the art versus non-fiction tension? 
We can consider his work, firstly, in terms of the compilation film, as ‘a 
chorus of bits’, in the words of Mulvey (2007, p. 109). In his important 
work on found footage montage, Wees usefully defines the compilation 
film as follows: 
[The] principal characteristics of nearly all compilation films: shots 
taken from films that have no necessary relationship to each other; 
a concept (theme, argument, story) that motivates the selection of 
the shots and the order in which they appear; and a verbal 
accompaniment (voice-over or text on the screen or both) that yokes 
the shots to the concept. (1993, p. 35) 
The main concern of Wees’ description is with ‘the media’s power to 
make ideologically loaded images seem like unmediated 
representations of reality’ (Wees 1993, p. 48). He thus outlines the 
degree to which documentary films interrogate corporate media 
representations, and draws a distinction between three techniques: 
compilation, appropriation and collage. These techniques are 
distinguished by the degree to which they ‘emphasize image-ness’ 
(Wees 1993, p. 47), with compilation films presuming a straightforward 
link with reality (such as The Atomic Café (Loader et al. 1982)), and 
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appropriation films presuming no link whatsoever (as in Michael 
Jackson’s Man in the Mirror (Wilson 1987). In contrast, the ‘collage film’ 
(A Movie (Conner 1958), for example), he maintains, ‘subjects its 
fragments of media-reality to some form of deconstruction, or at the 
very least, to a recontextualization that prevents an unreflective 
reception of representations of reality’ (Wees 1993, p. 47). Laying bare 
the artifice of representation is a ‘revolutionary’ artistic practice in Wees’ 
thinking. The basic problem, with Wees, however, is that his schematic 
outline of borrowed footage film fetishizes representation and 
referentially. The found footage film is either too referential 
(compilation) or not referential enough (appropriation). The Goldilocks 
moment is found in the modernist collage form, in which self-reflexivity 
offsets naïve realism and the surface play of postmodernism.  
For Wees, the compilation film doesn't go far enough to deconstruct 
corporate media representations. In the compilation film the ‘archival 
shot is presumed to have concrete, historical referents that ground the 
film’s discourse in reality, and lend credence to its overall argument’ 
(1993, p. 44). It would be tempting to situate Curtis in the compilation 
category. We could, for instance, draw similarities between Curtis’s 
work and Baldwin’s Tribulation 99: alien anomalies under America 
(Zryd 2003). And his films do present explanations for political reality, 
which can be judged on the basis of veracity. The images are employed 
as referential support for, rather than questioning, the explanations. 
However, Curtis doesn't work in terms of the parameters set forth by 
Wees here. And clearly Curtis’s films can’t be explained in terms of the 
appropriation film (with no link to the referent) or collage film (with its 
transformation of the image-ness of the image). Images work in a 
number of different ways in Curtis’s films. We find elements of the 
compilation film, and, at the same time, images working beyond 
referentiality. The directly referential aspect of Curtis—his political 
commentary—is best considered in terms of the conventions of 
journalism, the aim of which, if we follow Curtis at his word, is to tell the 
public what is happening in the world. This is at a time, it must be noted, 
when journalistic explanations seem to be in short supply. Curtis 
contends in a short piece titled, Oh dearism, and it is worth quoting at 
length:  
[…] in 1989 the West won the cold war. The old political story of left 
versus right was finished, but reporters still needed a grand simple 
story about the world into which all the chaotic events, and fragments 
of stuff that happen every day could be fitted. And waiting in the 
wings was the hippy counter-culture view of the world, a view which 
saw everything as a struggle between innocent individuals and 
corrupt political systems. TV news embraced it eagerly. And it 
worked. From the glorious revolutions in Eastern Europe, to the 
brave students in Tiananmen Square, through to the plucky 
Bosnians and the horror of Sarajevo, television news told a story of 
noble individuals bravely standing up against bad political systems. 
But this simple battle between good and evil couldn't last, and it 
finally cracked […] in Africa. [In 1994] a horrific war began [in 
Rwanda between the Hutu and Tutsi] in which four and a half million 
people died and everyone was evil, even the children. And that had 
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a terrible effect on television news, because when there weren’t any 
good or innocent people to support any longer the kind of news 
reporting invented in the 1990s made no sense. Because the news 
had given up reporting [conflicts] as political struggles it meant there 
was now no way to understand why these terrible events were 
happening. And instead, political conflicts around the world from 
Darfur to Gaza are now portrayed to us as simple illustrations of the 
mindless cruelty of the human race, about which nothing can be 
done. To which the only response is: ‘oh dear’. It’s like living in the 
mind of a depressed hippy. (Curtis 2007b) 
I take this assessment of contemporary journalism as crucial for 
engaging with Curtis. Clearly, his work seeks to reverse oh dearism. 
What makes Curtis compelling is that his films consist of a realist 
journalistic narrative voice with a visual style informed by, but not 
reducible to, the techniques of the compilation film. Curtis, in fact, has 
continued to explore the compilation film technique. The film It felt like 
a kiss (Curtis 2009), included as a component in an immersive theatre 
production, is the clearest example. The aforementioned disjunction 
between image and voice, which animates Curtis criticism, can thus be 
read as a dialectical relation. Instead of an either/or relation, image and 
narration combine in Curtis’s films to produce meaning effects. Curtis’s 
is a logic of both/and, rather than the negative logic of either/or. There 
are a number of image/narration effects at work that are embedded with 
the indexical meanings of their initial contexts—historical footage, TV 
news, ‘amateur’ video, advertising, golden age of Hollywood film, and 
so on—and we also find symbolic images as well: visual metaphor, the 
ideological image, the mood image, the movement image (signifying 
something happening without content) and so on.  
It is worth illustrating some of these images in relation to various 
unsystematic examples. Curtis logic is embedded in the interplay of 
image and narration. For instance, Curtis employs the standard 
documentary interview image (borrowed or shot by Curtis himself) with 
key figures and ‘experts’ (academics, government officials, and 
insiders). These figures speak for themselves, as it were, and their 
comments are edited in terms of the overall narrative trajectory of the 
film. For the most part, the interview functions as quoted information, 
as unfolding evidence. We always directly hear from and see key 
figures: Fredric Hayek, Ayn Rand, Edward Bernays, Philip Gould, and 
so on. There are also instances in which expert evidence is turned back 
against itself in compelling ways. For instance, we encounter the 
mathematician John Nash, in The Trap, finally reflecting upon the idea 
of the self-interested, calculating individual that underpins game theory, 
of which he is a founder. The film leads up to the moment of Nash’s 
admission that the figure of the self-interested, calculating individual is 
a ‘mistake’. This figure is too narrow a take on the complexities of 
human behaviour. Nash’s admission lends much weight to the film’s 
overall claim concerning the absurd consequences of neoliberal forms 
of governance that are underpinned by a game theory logic. In effect, 
Curtis is making what seems like an incorruptible claim: even the 
founder of the theory disavows it! (Curtis 2007a)  
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Alongside the standard interview technique, we find the ideological 
image. The orientalist film, The Thief of Bagdad (1940), in The Power 
of Nightmares works in precisely this way. The Power of Nightmares is 
a film that traces the rise of the ‘Neocons’ in US politics. Curtis contends 
that after the 9/11 attacks the Islamists were basically destroyed, but 
the neoconservatives opportunistically seized power and began to 
reconstruct America on the basis of a phantom enemy. The voice-over 
narrator (Curtis) tells us the Americans developed a picture of Bin 
Laden as ‘an all powerful figure at the head of a large terrorist network 
that had an organised hierarchy of control’. As this neoconservative 
fantasy is announced, we see the images from the The Thief of Bagdad. 
The shadowy figure of Jaffar (Conrad Veidt) grows with arms raised to 
bedevil the young king, Ahmad (John Justin). At this point in Curtis’s 
film, the images point directly to Western Orientalist ideology. As 
Edward Said argues in his much-cited book, Orientalism, Orientalism 
is ‘a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference 
between the familiar (Europe, West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, 
the East, ‘them’)’ (Said 1978, p. 43). This complex interplay between 
image and voice points to the ease with which the demonization of the 
Middle East is effected by neoconservatives. The Thief of Bagdad is 
also employed for similar effect in sequences detailing the fruitless 
search for the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. We see a scroll: ‘Ten 
thousand pieces of gold for the body of Ali Baba and the destruction of 
the band of thieves’.  
Further fragments work as visual metaphor. Among many examples – 
a dead forest signifying the failure of scientific research (The way of all 
flesh), high angle shots of city traffic to signify the machinic qualities of 
mass societies (Century of the self and The Trap), among others. We 
also see a reoccurring image of corridors in Curtis’s films. This image 
(a different corridor in each) is repeated in Pandora’s box, The trap, The 
power of nightmares, All watched over by machines of loving grace, 
and HyperNormalisation. In each of these films the corridor image 
dialectically connects with the narrative trajectory concerned with the 
iron cage rationality of political systems. For instance, in Pandora’s box 
an image of a long darkly lit and colourless corridor supplements a 
Russian expert explaining the Soviet plan for an engineered society. 
‘Each group [in society]’, he explains, ‘is governed by a set of iron laws 
as unchanging as the laws of nature, physics and the mechanical 
sciences’. In The power of nightmares the corridor appears in relation 
to statements asserting that Osama Bin Laden’s group was actually 
disorganized and became known as Al Qaeda only after September 11. 
The term, Al Qaeda, in fact, came from a key, yet unreliable US 
informant, Jamal Al Fadl. Curtis’s voice-over: ‘in reality Jamal Al Fadl 
was on the run from Bin Laden, having stolen money from him. In return 
for his evidence the Americans gave him witness protection in America, 
and hundreds of thousands of dollars’ (Curtis 2004). And in The Trap, 
in which corridors abound, the corridor appears in relation to Curtis’s 
voice-over: ‘the centre for developing the [cold war protectionist] 
strategy, was a military think tank called the Rand Corporation. The 
strategists at Rand used game theory to create mathematical models 
that predicted how the Soviets would behave in response to what they 
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saw the American’s doing. Out of this came the fundamental structure 
of the nuclear age’ (Curtis 2007a). In each of these examples, the 
corridor image follows an exterior shot of the building in which, we 
assume, the corridor is located. The corridor thus marks the interior, the 
space of power. The crucial point about these interiors, as constructed 
in the films, is that they are cold, indifferent and empty.   
The final image I will mention is the mood/affect image, or, more 
accurately, the something-is-happening-image. This ‘something’ is not 
named; it is prediscursive. Curtis films are punctuated by images of 
dancing, of freeways, and the setting desert sun, among many others. 
These images generally serve as a marker of the quotidian, the simple 
aspects of life as against complexity. For instance, we see images in 
Bitter Lake of a white soldier sitting in a ditch amidst trees, playing with 
a bird. The bird is perched upon the barrel of his gun. In the sequence, 
we hear the non-diegetic music of Ahmad Zahir, his ‘Aye Nam Ghumat: 
the Taranae Man’ track from the Afghan Album VII (1970). In the midst 
of footage of war-torn Afghanistan, the image serves no narrative 
purpose other than to add a dimension of humanity to the situation. 
Simple acts, such as enjoying nature, overlay the terribleness with hope 
(Curtis 2015).    
This is a rather unsystematic account of images in Curtis’s films, 
nevertheless it demonstrates the degree to which image and sound 
fragments work dialectically with voice to produce documentary 
meaning. To be clear, this typology of images is not to be taken in the 
sense proposed by Deleuze in his much-cited cinema books, Cinema 
1: the movement-image (1986) and Cinema 2: the time-image (1989). 
In these books, Deleuze forges philosophical concepts—such as the 
‘cinema of the body’ and ‘cinema of the brain’ (Deleuze 1989, p. 204)—
around the question of how cinema works as a mode of thought. 
Drawing upon Bergson’s work on time and space, and life and matter, 
he reveals what cinema as a whole shows ‘us about space and time 
that the other arts don't show’ (Deleuze 1995, p. 58). The current 
discussion on Curtis is not philosophically driven by Deleuze’s concern. 
Instead, my concern is with the pragmatic production of meaning. My 
claim is that we need to navigate between the two prevailing types of 
critical response to Curtis’s films: charges of conspiracy theory versus 
the sympathetic but cautious endorsement. This typology is thus 
designed to stress the productive conjunction between journalistic 
voice-over narration and compilation techniques that characterises 
Curtis’s practice. The upshot is that we can engage with the film’s 
claims about contemporary geopolitics, and, ultimately, the logic of his 
films.   
HyperNormalisation 
I want to turn now to Curtis’s latest film, HyperNormalisation (released 
October 2016 on the BBC iPlayer). My aim at this point will be to move 
the discussion towards some general observations on the logic of 
Curtis’s work, and then consider the implications of this logic for social 
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theory. As is characteristic of Curtis, HyperNormalisation is a dense film 
that uncovers the failure of politics to adequately grasp and deal with 
the present. The film draws together and recasts three trajectories of 
inquiry that are familiar across Curtis’s films. In this case, the 
trajectories are disjointed, and work in terms of a meanwhile this and 
then this form. The first consists of the key political and economic 
developments that have had a global impact. The second provides a 
critical account of the emergence of digital technology and automated 
management systems. And the third explores the rise of a new 
understanding of political resistance in 1960s and 1970s Europe and 
the USA. Each of these trajectories work as a set of disjointed forces, 
and each produces different and, at times dark, unpredictable effects 
across the globe. When drawn together, these trajectories produce the 
aforementioned general failure of contemporary politics. We might say 
that Curtis, as per Althusser, catalogues the overdetermined present, 
and that the political intersection of forces produces a complexity that 
seems impossible to manage. 
On the key political and economic developments trajectory, the bulk of 
the film, Curtis outlines the following: the city of New York’s shaky 
bankruptcy in 1975, the financial sector’s bailout of the city of New York 
and subsequent rise to power, Donald Trump’s business opportunism 
in New York in the 1980s, Henry Kissinger’s devastating balance of 
powers doctrine with respect to al-Assad in Syria and the Middle East, 
the shifting and almost comic US relationship with Gaddafi and Libya, 
the forging of the doctrine of the suicide bomber in Iran under Ayatollah 
Khomeini in the 1980s, Ronald Reagan’s disastrous retreat of US 
troops from the then increasingly complex Middle East, and Bush’s and 
Blair’s failed war upon Iraq. The film frames each of these situations as 
absurd political developments, and rather than confront this difficulty, 
Curtis maintains that politics retreats and, instead, resorts to 
constructing simple and reassuring narratives about the world.  
The second trajectory traces the rise of the libertarian Silicon Valley, 
and the strange connection between ‘computer utopians’ and 1960s 
counter-culture. At issue here, is the rise of the hegemony of anti-
hierarchical social forms as antidote to bureaucracy and institutional 
forms of politics. This is also a common theme in Curtis’s films. He 
suggests that computerisation and our increasing reliance upon 
networks and algorithms leads to the dehumanisation of the world. The 
messy world of human judgement, political debate, and reflection give 
way to a machinic world of rapid calculation and decision making. What 
counts is efficiency and predictability, rather than complex human 
desires and needs.    
And on the third trajectory, which I aim to explore in much more detail 
than the aforementioned trajectories, Curtis directly confronts the 
failure of contemporary resistance to these aforementioned political 
situations. It is worth mentioning that ‘politics’, in this context, seems to 
strictly refer to the institutional mechanisms of governance. The more 
general cultural studies sense of politics as power relations, or as 
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rupture, is not taken up by Curtis. Instead he works in terms of a politics 
versus resistance dyad. Given the dire situation of contemporary 
politics, the film thus turns to the question of resistance, and what forms 
of resistance have emerged to combat it. One might expect that an 
effective resistance movement might emerge to challenge this dire 
political condition. However, despite ruinous effects such as a 
destabilised Middle East, and the emergence of Trump’s authoritarian 
form of politics, and so on, Curtis maintains that a resistance movement 
with a lasting impact has, regrettably, failed to develop.  
In what is perhaps the most damning statement of the film, the failure 
of resistance movements is due to the rise of forms of action and 
organisation that are opposed to employing and engaging with politics 
and political ideas. Following the rise of individualism in the 1960s, 
Curtis maintains that in 1970s activism, art, and music, there emerged 
a form of social disconnection from politics. It became ‘cool’, he claims, 
to eschew politics and instead pursue self-experience and expression. 
Curtis employs 1970s footage of ‘alternative’ art and lifestyle practices 
to exemplify this claim. Patti Smith is cited as its central key 
spokesperson. Smith represented a new form of individualism that 
shunned collective political action. Curtis cites Smith: ‘I could not 
identify with the political movements any longer […] or the manic activity 
in the streets. In trying to join them, I felt overwhelmed by yet another 
form of bureaucracy’.   
At this point in the film, Curtis seems to accept Berardi’s claim that in 
the 1970s ‘a large-scale process of mass irony was launched’. 
Speaking from the context of Italy in the 1970s, Berardi recalls, ‘We 
saw’ resistance ‘as a suspension of the kingdom of necessity and were 
convinced that power [potere] has power [only] as far as those who 
have no power take power seriously’ (2009, p. 21). In other words, 
institutional forms of power are effective only because subjects 
concede to and therefore fuel the institution’s force. This means that 
disengaged and autonomist forms of resistance disrupt the effective 
operation of power. Disengaged resistance provides no ground for 
institutional power to produce effects. Starved of the necessary fuel, 
institutional power thus fades into insignificance and crashes, and new 
forms of social life begin to emerge.  
Across a number of films, along with HyperNormalisation, Curtis 
maintains that disengaged forms of resistance (the post-political left) 
have become dominant. He questions the effectiveness of such a form, 
and argues that it produces fruitless results. The post-political left no 
longer has any political sting, let alone any vision for the future. This 
means that rather than wither, politics remains unchecked and 
continues to produce its absurd and disastrous effects.  
Curtis’s criticism of post-politics and its refusal to engage at the 
institutional level is not uncommon. For instance, his argument 
corresponds to Žižek’s sharp suggestion that recent left politics is ‘a 
purely negative gesture of angry rejection and an equally abstract 
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demand for justice, lacking the ability to translate this demand into a 
concrete political programme’ (2014, 124). Similarly, Srnicek and 
Williams argue that the left ‘is more concerned to appear right than to 
think about the conditions of political change’ (2015, 22; see also Taylor 
2015).  For his part, Curtis points to the incapacity of disconnected 
forms of resistance and social organisation to adequately deal with and 
challenge power. All watched over by machines of loving grace makes 
the same claim. The effect of disconnected resistance merely allows 
political elites to become disconnected from the often-detrimental 
effects of political processes. We live in a post-political vacuum in which 
politics becomes increasingly unmoored from everyday life. 
The title of the film, HyperNormalisation, is thus a term that defines the 
general tenor of the post-political present. With it, Curtis gestures 
toward the problem of subjectivity and why this political absurdity is 
generally accepted or tolerated by the public. The century of the self is 
his most extended engagement with this problem, in which theories of 
consciousness derived from psychoanalysis provide the basis for 
manipulating public opinion. In Hypernormalisation the problem is set 
forth on the terrain of ideology critique, though the film doesn’t explore 
this terrain in any detail. Hypernormalisation basically means: the bulk 
of the public live as if this absurd situation is normal. Of course, this 
doesn't mean that no one thinks that there is nothing strange about 
politics and economics today. Reactions to the rise of Donald Trump, 
as well to common situations such as the perpetual restructuring of 
public intuitions, suggest many do. The point is that despite the 
absurdity of contemporary politics the public acts as if this is politics as 
usual. Curtis finds a parallel for the performance of this is politics as 
usual in Alexei Yurchak’s work on the final years of the Soviet Union. 
The term, ‘hypernormalisation’, is drawn from his book, Everything was 
forever, until it was no more: the last Soviet generation (2005). As in 
the late Soviet Union, Curtis would have it that the political present in 
the West is hypernormal. This is to say that not only do we think that 
politics today is normal, we also think it is normal that there are no 
alternatives. He argues, we live in a carefully constructed make believe 
world that has long since abandoned a commitment to political ideas, 
and robust political debate and action.  
As the title of the film suggests, the tiredness of the situation in the 
Soviet Union serves as the key metaphor for this abandonment. Curtis 
states: 
Those who ran the Soviet Union had believed they could plan and 
manage a new kind of socialist society. But, they had discovered that 
it was impossible to control and predict everything, and the plan ran 
out of control. Rather than reveal this, the technocrats began to 
pretend that everything was still going according to plan. And what 
emerged instead was a fake version of the society. The Soviet Union 
became a society where everyone knew what their leaders said was 
not real, because they would see with their own eyes that the 
economy was falling apart. But, everybody had to play along and 
pretend that it was real, because no one could imagine any 
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alternative. One Soviet writer called this hypernormalisation. You 
were so much a part of the system that it was impossible to see 
beyond it. The fakeness was hypernormalised (Curtis 2016).   
This sequence opens with the sound of the Janka and the Great 
October track, ‘Grief Washing is Light’, from the Declassed Elements 
album (2012). On screen is the oft repeated image metaphor of an 
empty bureaucratic corridor. The camera tracks along the corridor and 
turns to the left, and repeats several times. The sound track fades and 
is replaced by the sound of old telephones ringing. At the point in which 
Curtis states ‘Rather than reveal this, the technocrats began to pretend’ 
the camera remains stationary, as if thinking. The camera then turns in 
the opposite direction tracking through the corridor once again. The 
sequence metaphorically reveals the circularity and insularity of the 
technocratic operations of the State. Curtis shows how detached the 
technocrats were from the outside social world. The point the film 
makes is that the Soviet iron cage is not unlike the post-political vacuum 
in the contemporary West.  
Given the centrality of the metaphor for the film, it will be worth 
unpacking Yurchak’s account of hypernormalisation. Curtis’s logic can 
be clearly located in this encounter with Yurchak (though Yurchak is not 
directly referenced in the film). This encounter also reveals the 
substance of Curtis’s account of our political times. I will show how he 
bends Yurchak to fit his purpose. As I stated, Yurchak’s book seeks to 
provide an account of Soviet life in the final years of the Soviet system. 
This account is framed by a key question: how is it that despite the 
increasing tiredness of the Soviet system the public seemingly 
continued to support it? This question is crucial for Yurchak because 
he aims to challenge explanations of the social that draw upon 
postmodern simulation or ideology critique. The standard explanation 
is that the Soviets mimicked or simulated allegiance to the State in 
public while maintaining dissidence in private. We ‘could conclude’ as 
in the case of Epstein (2000), Yurchak cautions, ‘that the late Soviet 
world became a kind of ‘postmodern’ universe where grounding was no 
longer possible, and where reality became reduced to discursive 
simulacra’ (p. 75). Baudrillard is, of course, cited by Yurchak to 
exemplify the postmodern problem. Yurchak argues that critical work 
that takes up Baudrillard’s articulation of hyperreality, as Yurchak 
understands it, to explain the absurdity of late Soviet society falls into a 
binary trap. In the hyperreality explanation the hegemonic ideology of 
the party becomes completely detached from everyday reality. As a 
consequence, Soviet citizens occupy a strange space in which their 
public pro-government displays are ‘either true (‘real’ support) or false 
(‘dissimulation’ of support)’ (Yurchak 2005, p. 17).  
Žižekian forms of ideology critique (1991) suffer from a similar problem. 
Attempting to overcome this binary, Žižek maintains, subjects will only 
accept their lived reality if they believe this acceptance is an expression 
of free subjectivity. Free subjectivity emerges when the subject is able 
to establish a conscious distance, an ‘ideological disidentification’, from 
explicit ideals and prescriptions. Authority hoodwinks no one and yet, 
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crucially, all comply. As such, ideology takes a cynical form. As Žižek 
puts it, ‘they know it, but they are doing it anyway’, or, in another 
formulation, ‘I know politicians are untrustworthy but I still act as though 
I do not know this’. If we follow ideology critique, we could contend this 
is the cynicism that characterises life in late Soviet society. This cynical 
form arises because the subject’s relationship to authority is fetishistic. 
Politics is less about knowledge, than symbolic forms, and empty 
master signifiers around which political identifications galvanise. 
Political identification is mediated through identifications with others, 
more precisely, the ‘big other’ (the party) who believes for them despite 
what they might cynically think. The subject believes in the belief of the 
big other, participates, and thus gains identity. At the same time, 
however, they are absolved from any responsibility for political 
outcomes.  
For Yurchak, however, these explanations fall short. Yurchak, instead, 
turns to speech act theory and argues that the Soviet public supported 
the Soviet state but not in terms of the split between the simulated and 
real or the public and private. He argues ‘the ritualized acts and speech 
acts of authoritative discourse were not simply replicated because of 
institutional power relations, control or threat of punishment. They were 
replicated because of the importance of the performative dimension’ (p. 
27) of language. He argues that explanations derived from the 
hyperreal or ideological cynicism fail to engage with the pragmatic 
aspects of language, and fail to take the position that language speaks 
us rather than expresses an inner self. For Yurchak, the irreducibility 
and, at the same time, indissociablity of the constative and performative 
dimensions of language are crucial. Drawing upon debates around 
Austin’s (1962) How to do things with words, Yurchak underscores the 
historically shifting relationship between the constative dimension of 
speech acts (cultural meaningfulness) and the performative dimensions 
(normalized routines and practices). He argues that in Soviet society 
‘the replication of the fixed and normalized forms of discourse became 
an end in itself, and the constative meanings of these discursive forms 
became increasingly unimportant’ (p. 26). This led to the situation in 
which language became ‘hypernormalized’—that is ‘fixed and 
cumbersome forms of language that were often neither interpreted nor 
easily interpretable at the level of constative meaning’ (p. 50). The 
problem is thus not whether or not the subject actually believes or is 
cynical, or that the subject simulates in order to conceal their actual 
feelings and thoughts, it is that there is a disconnection between pro-
government support and constative meaning. In other words, the 
performance of support is meaningless from the perspective of the 
subject. This is not to say, of course, that the life of subjects is 
meaningless. In fact, Yurchak carefully draws upon a wide range of 
cultural materials to demonstrate that ‘the performative reproduction of 
the form of rituals and speech acts actually enabled the emergence of 
diverse, multiple, and unpredictable meanings in everyday life’ (p. 25).  
It is worth pointing out, that despite Yurchak’s dismissal of the 
hyperreality explanation for late Soviet society, Baudrillard’s account of 
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‘the masses’ is not antithetical to his position. Baudrillard’s masses are 
comparable to Yurchak’s performative public. As Baudrillard explains: 
power manipulates nothing, the masses are neither mislead nor 
mystified. […] This comforts it in its illusion of being power, and leads 
away from the much more dangerous fact that this indifference of the 
masses is their true, their only practice, that there is no other ideal of 
them to imagine, nothing in this to deplore, but everything to analyse 
as the brute fact of a collective retaliation and of a refusal to 
participate in the recommended ideals, however enlightened (1983, 
p. 14). 
If Baudrillard views indifference as a form of refusal, for Yurchak the 
performative distances subjects from hegemonic meaning. In a 
hypernormalized society the relationship between constative 
meaning—ideology, beliefs, and so on—and the performative 
dimension of language is unsettled. As Yurchak argues: 
precisely because authoritative language was hegemonic, 
unavoidable, and hypernormalized, it was no longer read by its 
audiences literally, at the level of constative meanings. Therefore, 
which statements represented ‘facts’ and which did not was relatively 
unimportant. Instead, Soviet people engaged with authoritative 
language at the level of the performative dimension (p. 76).  
There is no accounting for what the public think. For instance, we can 
say the same for supporters of Donald Trump. Concerns with the 
veracity of the factual claims he makes, or with ideological fidelity, are 
outweighed by the performative and ritualistic dimensions authoritative 
discourse calls forth. Trump supporters consider themselves to be part 
of something without that something having any need for constative 
consistency.  
If we consider Curtis’s film in relation to Yurchak‘s book, two points 
emerge. Firstly, in Curtis’s film the Soviet public is articulated as 
downtrodden and without hope. This is because he falls into the binary 
trap that Yurchak is careful to avoid. As Yurchak puts it, what ‘tends to 
get lost in binary accounts is the crucial and seemingly paradoxical fact 
that, for a great number of Soviet citizens, many of the fundamental 
values, ideals, and realities of socialist life […] were of genuine 
importance’ (p. 8), despite the situation of their everyday lives. For 
Curtis, the downtrodden Soviet public don’t believe in it but act as if they 
do. And secondly, Curtis takes his analysis further than Yurchak. 
Hypernormalisation bends away from the terrain of everyday practices 
and becomes a term for the general cynicism of global power. Politics 
has become detached from the everyday public and from democratic 
processes. This is a developing theme in Curtis’s films. Power now 
hides behind a veil of public relations, which works not coherently in 
terms of a clear set of on-going political ideas, but, conversely, 
incoherently. Its aim is to produce a perplexed public. Increasingly, 
Curtis maintains, unsettling the relation between the real and fake is a 
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key strategy of power. This strategy is underscored, in the film, with a 
return to the former Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia. He states:   
After the failure of the revolutions [Occupy Wall Street and the Arab 
Spring], it was not just the radicals, no one in the West had any idea 
of how to change the world. At home, the politicians had given so 
much of their power away, to finance and the ever-growing 
managerial bureaucracies, that they in effect had become managers 
themselves. While abroad, all of their adventures had failed, and 
their simplistic vision of the world had been exposed as dangerous 
and destructive.  
As a consequence, politics becomes a strange kind of theatre, best 
exemplified by post-Soviet Russia and Putin’s PR machine—the 
‘political technologists’. The key figure here is Vladislav Surkov, one of 
Putin’s closest advisors. He originally came from the theatre world, 
Curtis tells us, and he has taken ideas from avant-garde theatre and 
applied them to politics. His aim, Curtis explains, was to transform 
politics into a strange kind of theatre in which the public become unsure 
of what is actually happening. In a kind of Orwellian sense, Curtis 
contends the Kremlin sponsored a range of groups, from mass anti-
fascist groups to the opposite, neo-nazi skinheads, as well as liberal 
human rights groups. These groups all challenged the government. The 
crucial aspect of this strategy, is that Surkov let it be known the Kremlin 
was behind each group. The upshot is that no one knows what is real 
or fake. Power keeps any opposition constantly confused. The 
sequence concludes with Donald Trump, and his constantly shifting 
campaign. This campaign is marked by its lack of coherency. Trump 
has attacked Republicans, Democrats, and Wall Street. We might call 
this a compelling madness, in which we find messages for hard right 
nationalists, for anti-Wall Street campaigns, for anti-Trans Pacific 
Partnership activists, as well as the disaffected working class.   
Television documentary as social theory 
I want to conclude with some brief consideration of the implications of 
Curtis’s journalistic provocations on contemporary power. Where does 
thinking with Curtis lead us? Firstly, with Curtis it is clear that causal 
explanations for social phenomena are not straightforward. 
Contemporary power works across and through multiple fronts. Clearly, 
Curtis’s logic engages with this political complexity. There is no singular 
causal mechanism, such as social class, the economy, the sovereign 
individual, or political idea such as the equalising force of self-
organising systems, that shapes the social world. The composition of 
these films themselves—complex fragments (indexes of the past) 
drawn from the archive to form a narrative—ought, quite literally, to be 
understood as a grapple with complexity. The many image types, which 
I have gestured toward with an unsystematic and incomplete typology, 
reveal that there is no straightforward way to represent the social and 
the political. Curtis’s logic can be characterised as a compelling poetics, 
one that undermines one-dimensional explanatory approaches and 
which, however tenuous, draws together multiple social situations and 
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strands of thought. He attempts to articulate social complexity and, on 
this basis, reveals the inadequacy of political elites to sufficiently 
engage with it. If such links across these situations and strands seem 
tenuous, it does not necessarily mean that Curtis can be considered a 
mad conspiracy theorist (as in the aforementioned first strand of 
criticism). Rather, these links remain open because they are difficult to 
pin down. This difficulty is precisely what his films articulate. His claim 
is that politics should grapple with this difficulty too.  
Secondly, and I will develop this point more fully, Curtis is well attuned 
to shifts in the logic of power across time. The problem of social control 
is a central theme in many of Curtis’s films. His earlier work—The 
Power of Nightmares, The trap, All watched over by machines of loving 
grace, and Bitter lake—focus upon well-intentioned politicians 
employing political ideas to make society more stable and reasonable. 
As I suggested, these intentions are undermined by complexity. The 
ideas and the politicians themselves have been far too inflexible to be 
effective. As a consequence, instead of a stable and better world we 
find its obverse, a world marked by increasing confusion, instability, 
rising inequality, and more empowered elites. Yet the problem, for 
Curtis, is not so much political ideas themselves—his work does not 
lead to neo-anarchist forms of politics in which individuals express 
themselves in fluid social arrangements. Rather, I think, he has tended 
to point to the need for a more robust and dynamic sphere for political 
ideas.  
In HyperNormalisation, however, this emphasis upon well-intentioned 
but flawed political elites begins to fade. HyperNormalisation is Curtis’s 
most pessimistic film (it is one of the few of his films that includes no 
images of dancing), particularly when read alongside Yurchak, whose 
concept Curtis borrows. In Yurchak’s hands, hypernormalisation is 
uncannily optimistic when compared with Curtis. As I stated, the film 
concludes with the figures of cynical political elites, Putin and Trump, 
and the confusing reality produced by their public relations machines. 
If we think with Curtis, we find ourselves in a more dire situation than 
ever before. Power now disappears behind a public relations veil, if it 
exists in any conventional sense to persuade, seduce, threaten, and so 
on, and is replaced by a confusing simulation of power. As such, power 
paradoxically becomes more destructive. In this confusing and 
unchecked form an authoritarian and extreme nationalism has begun 
to take hold. In its pessimism, HyperNormalisation bears a striking 
resemblance to Baudrillard’s later work. In this, Baudrillard points to a 
new form of cynicism emerging within politics. No longer requiring to be 
shored up by objective measures of the social world, and no longer 
adapted to democratic impulses (such as in Dean 2009, pp. 25-30), 
politics becomes ever more contemptuous. Inflexibility has been 
overtaken by disdain. Putin and Trump loom large on this horizon. As 
Baudrillard puts it in a different, yet corresponding situation:  
Truth must be on the side of Good. There can be no intelligence on 
the side of Evil. Yet all those who outdo themselves with arrogance 
(Le Pen), cynicism (Le Lay), pornography (Abu Ghraib), mythomania 
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(Marie L.) unmask the truth of the system in their abuse of it. (2010, 
p. 39) 
The truth of the system, from this perspective, is that political processes 
have become detached from power. Power now doesn’t even bother to 
hide behind science to justify itself, as per Foucault’s path-breaking 
account of the rise of the human sciences in Discipline and punish: the 
birth of the prison (1977). And, as Baudrillard continues, with a chilling 
resemblance to the claims in HyperNormalisation, ‘one can no longer 
counter the system in the name of one’s own principles since the 
system has abolished them. The end of all critical negativity’ (2010, p. 
50).  
Where does this leave us? If we follow Baudrillard, we must wait for the 
impending implosion of the system. The end of negativity means that 
the produced integral reality becomes increasingly paranoid and 
eventually exhausts itself. The impossible task of ultimate control 
across multiple fronts must catch up sooner or later. If we follow Curtis, 
and here he will part company with Baudrillard, the task is to find a way 
to politically engage with complexity, to sort through the real and the 
fake, and to overturn the iron cage of rationality. However, a clear 
version of what such a sorting and overturning entails is not forthcoming 
in his films. What we do find instead is the romantic figure of the heroic 
journalist, but perhaps such a figure is long overdue.  
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